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INTRODUCTION
At the time of this writing, recent events in Ferguson, Baltimore,
New York City, and elsewhere have triggered quite justified social outrage
at debtors’ prisons. Our country’s state and city courts keep scores of indi-
gent people in jail for the crime of being poor, despite the Supreme
Court’s clear prohibition on the practice. Skilled litigators and their jour-
nalist allies have seized on the moment to win victories in court and in the
public eye, which prevent unconscionable bond and probation practices
and try to reduce our burgeoning jail populations. Lost in the uproar,
though, are the many ways that a savvy anti-defendant judge could insulate
herself from corrective litigation, evade effective judicial oversight, and es-
sentially perpetuate current debtors’ prisons by using pretextual sanctions
and contempt orders to circumvent Bearden v. Georgia indigency
determinations.
Contempt orders, bond increases, and drug testing are all means to
jail the poor without facially violating the core holding of Bearden. As de-
scribed in detail below, a judge who makes an effective record can use
these processes to wring money, jail time, or guilty pleas out of reluctant
defendants. This Essay is not a how-to guide for the antipathetic judges but
rather an attempt to highlight how reliance on Bearden and procedural
rights fail to rein in the more pernicious pretextual sanctions levied against
* Litigation Director, Orleans Public Defenders. B.A. Yale University 2002, J.D.
University of Michigan Law School 2008.
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the poor. The practices described in this Essay all occur with some fre-
quency in the state and city criminal courts in New Orleans, where the
author practices; presumably, the New Orleans judges are not alone in
their use of quasi-legal procedural mechanisms to extort money and guilty
pleas from indigent defendants.
Part I of this Essay reviews the Supreme Court’s holding in Bearden.
Part II explains a variety of methods that judges can use to circumvent
Bearden’s requirements and keep the poor imprisoned. Part III suggests the
first steps necessary to renew Bearden’s promise in future litigation.
True reform requires either long-term, time-intensive data collection
to bring to light the insidiousness of the practices at issue or a sea change in
how reviewing courts and the public at large view the purposes and proce-
dures of the criminal justice system.
I. BEARDEN’S PROMISE
In 1983, the Supreme Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that “in revo-
cation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing
court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.”1 This holding
encapsulates the core legal underpinning of the fight against debtors’ pris-
ons: “By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could
not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or
the propriety of reducing the fine or extending the time for payments or
making alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into a
prison sentence.”2  In other words, if a person is brought to court because
he owes money, he cannot be sent to jail just because he does not have the
money.
Today, Bearden is invoked in courtrooms throughout America to pro-
test when judges attempt to jail a defendant for reasons that directly or
indirectly stem from poverty.3 State criminal codes have been explicitly
judicially overridden to take Bearden into account.4 So, how is it that every
day in courtrooms across America criminal defendants are sent to jail for
being poor?  Have courts been ignoring the Supreme Court’s mandate for
thirty-three years? No. At least, not always. The answer, in part, is that the
1. 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., People v. Roletto, No. 13CA2315, 2015 WL 1660616, at *4 (Colo. App.
Apr. 9, 2015) (explaining that Colorado’s statutory scheme for probation revocation incorporates
requirements of Bearden); Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1010 (Fla. 2011) (discussing which
party has the burden at Bearden-related proceedings); State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 724, 742 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2010) (“The statutory scheme thus creates a classification based on wealth, depriving
a certain class of citizens indefinitely of their liberty as a result of their inability to pay.”).
4. State v. Zabaleta, 689 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1997) (“Granted. The portion of relator’s
sentence which provides for a jail term in the event of default of payment of a fine is vacated. An
indigent person may not be incarcerated because he is unable to pay a fine which is part of his
sentence.”).
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criminal justice system sets up the poor by pressuring them to plead guilty
and then requiring repeated and unreasonably frequent contact with the
criminal justice system through probation oversight, court dates for paying
outstanding court debt, and frequent drug testing. The methods courts
use, as described below, put the poor under unique pressure that would be
unlikely to influence more affluent defendants. By squeezing guilty pleas
out of the poor, and then emptying their pockets or filling the jails with
them when they fail to make payments, courts can perpetuate debtors’
prisons.
II. PUTTING ON THE SQUEEZE: HOW JUDGES SUBTLY LEVERAGE
POVERTY INTO GUILTY PLEAS AND JAIL TIME
What follows is a non-exclusive set of examples of how the judiciary
can circumvent the spirit of Bearden with what I refer to as pretextual mea-
sures that are facially legal but nonetheless result in the jailing of the indi-
gent for the “crime” of poverty. The examples I have chosen are drug
testing, bond modifications, and contempt of court sanctions, though
again these are by no means the only ways to achieve this end result.
A. Drug Testing
Imagine that you are arrested for a minor drug offense, such as pos-
session of prescription drugs without a prescription or possession of crack
cocaine. The judge sets a reasonable bond, which you make and are re-
leased. Weeks or months later, you are subpoenaed to come to court for
your arraignment on a Friday morning. In the interim, you also had minor
surgery for which the doctor prescribed prescription painkillers. When
you appear, the district attorney announces to the judge that they will
offer you probation if you plead guilty to the felony charges. Unprepared
to sully your record, you decline. The judge, wanting to “move her
docket” (i.e., reduce the number of open cases in her court), disapproves
of your decision and decides to turn the screws. She tells you to take a
drug test since you are facing a drug charge and because a condition of
bond is that you do not engage in illegal activities. After the results come
back, the judge tells you that your opiate levels are “through the roof” and
that she will need to take action. You try to explain that you are taking
prescription painkillers (you do this yourself because the judge has not yet
determined if she will appoint a lawyer to represent you). She asks if you
brought proof of those prescriptions. Unsurprisingly, you did not. Now
comes the moment of truth: the judge tells you she is going to remand you
to jail, either by holding you in contempt or by raising your bond because
of the failed drug test—in at least some states both options are available.5 If
5. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 336 (2011) (stating that drug test failure
results in contempt of court); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 342 (2010) (providing that the
court may increase bond on its own motion for good cause).
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you have proof of the prescriptions, she says, you can bring it to court next
week, but you will at least be in jail over the weekend. Or, she reminds
you, you can plead guilty to probation today, and the case will close. What
would you do?
Everything the judge did in the above scenario is legal, at least in
some states, or is very hard to challenge. A lawyer who wants to challenge
the judge’s ordering of the drug test would have to find a person who
chose not to plead guilty and instead went to jail, or there would be ripe-
ness or mootness problems. The alternative would be to file some sort of
injunctive action; winning would likely require sufficient data to convince
a reviewing court that the judge’s ostensibly legal actions were in fact
nefarious.
Judges use drug testing as a tool to induce reluctant defendants to
plead guilty. These judges are not actually concerned about whether the
defendants are using drugs, as probation would not be an option if they
plead guilty. This pretextual practice disproportionately affects the poor,
who come to court without counsel and without the ability to pay the
threatened increase in bonds. Yet, as noted above, proving that any individ-
ual order to submit to a drug test was pretextual and unjustified by the
defendant’s appearance or charges is extremely difficult due to the posture
of the cases and the wide discretion judges have in bond setting.
B. Bond Increases
The above drug-testing scenario is a multi-step process that in some
ways insulates the judge from effective review. But even a stripped-down
version is frustratingly hard to challenge. Imagine instead that you arrive in
court for your arraignment under the same circumstances as described in
the original drug-testing scenario. Instead of asking you to submit to a
drug test, though, the judge asks the district attorney about your bond.
The judge learns you received a recognizance bond, also called a “free
bond” or “signature bond,” which is not secured with any sort of collat-
eral. Prompted by the judge’s question, the prosecutor moves to raise your
bond in light of the more detailed police report that has been generated
since your bond was set. That report includes some new details of your
arrest, which the state says merit a bond increase. Now, those details are
unimportant because the prosecutor and the judge have an unspoken un-
derstanding: when the judge asks the state what an out of jail defendant’s
bond is at arraignment, that is the prosecutor’s cue to ask for a bond in-
crease. To withstand review, the judge must have “good cause” to raise the
bond. A new fact, even a small one, is probably enough to pass muster. So
as long as the prosecutor finds something to say based on the full police
report when moving for the bond increase, the judge will be authorized to
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increase the bond.6 Bond setting is extremely discretionary, and reviewing
courts very rarely will overturn a bond increase.7 Furthermore, the judge
does not need to raise the bond very much to achieve her goal: any in-
crease at all will land you in jail, which is the consequence the judge
desires to hold over your head unless, of course, you decide to plead guilty,
which you would likely do under such circumstances. After a guilty plea,
the case and the judge’s methods will never actually be reviewed.
As this hypothetical demonstrates, a threatened bond increase is likely
to cause someone who would otherwise fight his case to plead guilty if it
means remaining out of jail. But due to the discretion afforded to judges
and the ostensible legality of the judge’s determination, proving that any
individual bond increase is illegal verges on impossible, so judges will con-
tinue to employ the practice to ensure that as few defendants as possible
“clog” their court dockets.
C. Contempt Orders
The first two scenarios involve pressuring defendants to plead guilty
in order to close their cases and to secure the court costs and fines assessed
at the time of the plea.8 The last scenario involves post-disposition efforts
to wring payments out of poor defendants who owe money to the court.
It is clearly established that a person too poor to pay cannot be arrested
simply for being delinquent on his payments.9 But, unsurprisingly, the
poor are frequently reluctant to come to court when they owe money and
cannot afford to pay it.10 If the court is willing to act as a collections agent,
it can require that a convicted defendant report for court for a “payment
status date” each time a payment is owed. If the defendant misses the next
payment date set, for either justifiable or non-justifiable reasons, the court
can sentence him to contempt when he next appears in court.11 Generally,
this means that the defendant is arrested on a bench warrant for missing
court and must then appear in court to answer to the judge for missing his
payment date.12 This sequence raises a number of questions and problems:
6. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 342 (2010) (allowing judges to increase
bond for good cause).
7. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir.
1980) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to bond amount challenges); Ex parte
Flores, No. 14–15–00619–CR, 2015 WL 9241455, at *1 (Tex. App. Dec. 15, 2015) (“Under
this standard, we may not disturb the trial court’s decision if it falls within the zone of reasonable
disagreement.”).
8. See supra Part II.A-B.
9. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
10. See Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc.: Does the Alternatives-to-Incarceration Industry
Profit from Injustice?, THE NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014.
11. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21 (1966) (indicating that missing court
is direct contempt).
12. In New Orleans, judges will occasionally issue “pay or stay” orders in these circum-
stances, which are patent Bearden violations. For example, the judge would give the defendant a
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reduced oversight of misdemeanor plea process; findings of direct con-
tempt when defendants are absent from court; what amount of process is
due at contempt hearings; and whether the right to counsel applies at con-
tempt hearings.
1. The Scenario
This scenario happens as follows: the defendant comes to court
charged with a municipal offense. Potentially, he is in jail at that time. The
judge calls the case and advises the defendant that if he would like to waive
his rights, including the right to counsel, he may plead guilty and receive a
fine and a suspended sentence contingent on payment of the fine. If he
pleads guilty, he will get out of jail. The defendant accepts the offer, and
the judge conducts a formal Boykin procedure,13 in which the defendant
acknowledges that he is pleading without counsel and accepts that he is
doing so. At the end of the colloquy, the judge orders the defendant to
return in thirty days to make his first payment toward the costs and fines
that he has been assessed as part of the plea. When the defendant misses his
payment date, he is soon arrested on a bench warrant for missing court.
When he appears, the judge sentences him to ten days in jail as direct
contempt for missing court.14 A lawyer is never involved in the process, so
a lawyer never has the chance to determine whether the defendant’s
charges are valid or to warn the defendant about the potential conse-
quences of a plea.
Several points during this process are legally suspect. Can the judge
actually advise someone of his option to plead without first determining
whether he wants or needs counsel? Can a person waive his right to coun-
sel in order to plead without a full Faretta15 hearing?  Can a person who
pled guilty without counsel later be sentenced to contempt—technically a
new crime apart from the underlying plea—without running afoul of
Shelton?16
It is clear that misdemeanants frequently plead to suspended
sentences or court costs that require them to return to court, pay fines, and
otherwise subject themselves to the supervision of the court and ongoing
choice between paying $200 and spending ten days in jail. Obviously the Constitution does not
permit the judge to allow some defendants to buy their freedom and to incarcerate those who
cannot afford to pay. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
13. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (establishing the rights that must be read to
defendants at the time of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea).
14. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 25 (1991) (providing that contemnors
can be sentenced to up to six months in prison).
15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that a defendant must be fully
apprised of the pitfalls of uncounseled legal practice before proceeding pro se).
16. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding a suspended sentence illegal if
the defendant was not provided counsel prior to guilty plea).
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contact with the criminal justice system.17 It is less clear whether they
understand the real consequences of making these pleas. Unfortunately, as
explained below, courts have generally concluded that misdemeanor and
municipal courts are low-stakes affairs meriting somewhat less protection
than felony courts.18
2. Misdemeanor Plea Process
In Alabama v. Shelton, the United States Supreme Court promised
that “a suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a
person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded
‘the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged.”19
Shelton was an extension of the principles in Argersinger v. Hamlin, in which
the Court held that defense counsel must be appointed in any criminal
prosecution—“whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony”—
“that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period.”20 Shelton and
Argersinger require courts to offer the assistance of counsel at the state’s ex-
pense.21 They do not require that counsel actually be present or ap-
pointed.22 As explained below, the Court has since stripped the
protections afforded in Shelton and Argersinger by permitting defendants to
waive counsel when they plead after only minimal process.23 Because of
this, the “guiding hand of counsel,” while theoretically available, is often
absent in misdemeanor courts, despite pleas that “actually lead[ ] to
imprisonment.”24
Case law throughout the United States is generally rather permissive
in terms of allowing uncounseled pleas to low-level offenses, provided that
judges perform a proper colloquy about the waiver.25 In Iowa v. Tovar, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Iowa
Supreme Court’s holding that a full and rigorous colloquy was required
17. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, at A1; see also Stillman, supra note 10.
18. See infra note 30.
19. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 40 (1972)).
20. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33, 37.
21. See id. at 32-33, 37.
22. See id. at 37-38.
23. See infra note 34.
24. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 657, 658 (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33, 40).
25. See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) (“We have described a waiver of
counsel as intelligent when the defendant knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629
(2002) (“[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if
the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in
the circumstances—even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences
of invoking it.”) (emphasis in original).
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exceeded federal constitutional minimums.26 The Iowa Supreme Court
held:
[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty with-
out the assistance of an attorney must be advised of the useful-
ness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in
order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel . . . . [T]he trial judge [must] advise the defendant
generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may
not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving the
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the
risk that a viable defense will be overlooked. The defendant
should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney
he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion
on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to
plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant
understands the nature of the charges against him and the range
of allowable punishments.27
In rejecting this requirement, Justice Ginsburg voiced concern for
the unanimous Court:
The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory
might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious
defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser
charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant
delays his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a
tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the
prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the re-
sources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or the
defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed
counsel) will be wasted.28
In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to its previous decision in
Patterson v. Illinois for the proposition that at pretrial proceedings “the full
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and
more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.”29
State courts have also adopted this permissive, reduced-process view,
allowing misdemeanor and municipal courts to engage in “group” or
“mass” waivers of swaths of defendants at a time, including informing all
incarcerated defendants (in some jurisdictions, those “in the box”) of their
26. 541 U.S. at 86-87.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 90.
29. Id. (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)).
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rights at once.30 These courts have also put the burden on the defense to
show an irregularity in a waiver proceeding, accepting, for example, judi-
cial checklists as prima facie evidence that the court properly instructed a
defendant of the rights being given up at a pro se plea.31
There is great danger in this logic. Essentially, the courts are presum-
ing regularity in the proceedings of the least formal and least regulated
courts in our country.32 They are doing so because they presume the con-
sequences of error are low, but their approach fails to account for the debt-
ors’ prison cycle discussed in this Essay. Failure to ensure that defendants
understand that a plea will require ongoing and often onerous continued
contact with the criminal justice system is a recipe for filling municipal jails
with low-level offenders who failed to comply with misdemeanor proba-
tion or who were held in contempt when they missed court.33 Yet, be-
cause summary warnings are considered sufficient for these “minor”
offenses, few judges are likely to opt to fully convey this possible chain of
events to a defendant who has professed his desire to plead guilty. Most
judges will prefer a closed case to an informed defendant when given the
choice.
3. Contempt Process
The original hypothetical in this subsection focused on contempt—
specifically, direct contempt for absence from court.  The use of direct
contempt in the example is intentional, and significant due to the minimal
process required before a direct contempt conviction. The United States
Supreme Court has affirmed the right to counsel at contempt hearings,
30. See, e.g., State v. Strain, 585 So. 2d 540, 544 (La. 1991) (“Determining the defen-
dant’s understanding of his waiver of counsel in a guilty plea to an uncomplicated misdemeanor
requires less judicial inquiry than determining his understanding of his waiver of counsel for a
felony trial.”); State v. Miller, 404 N.W.2d 45 (Neb. 1987) (When there has been a group
arraignment, the record must affirmatively disclose that the criminal defendant was present when
the court advised those charged of their rights.); Picetti v. State, 192 P.3d 704, 708 (Nev. 2008)
(“During the mass advisement for Picetti’s first-offense DUI conviction, the justice court in-
formed Picetti of his right to have an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and that if he
could not afford an attorney, one would be provided without cost. The justice court also in-
formed Picetti of the nature of the charges against him and the possible punishment involved,
including the enhanced penalties involved in a DUI citation. The justice court further instructed
misdemeanor defendants to ask any questions they wished during the individual colloquy.”); cf.
Hatten v. State, 89 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. App. 2002) (“In misdemeanor cases where the defen-
dant’s guilt is not contested, the trial court is not required to admonish the defendant as to the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, but must only see that the defendant voluntarily
and intelligently waived his right to counsel.”).
31. See, e.g., State v. LeGrand, 541 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Neb. 1995) (“A checklist, authen-
ticated by the signature or initials of the judge, which indicates that all constitutional require-
ments have been met, becomes a part of the record and may affirmatively establish an intelligent
and knowing guilty plea.”).
32. See id.
33. See supra note 17.
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except summary contempt proceedings.34 The federal circuits overwhelm-
ingly, though not universally, agree that absence from court—that is, “ab-
sconding” or failing to report when subpoenaed—is not subject to
summary proceedings.35 There is a divide among the states about the pro-
cess required before it is appropriate to sentence a court absconder for
contempt.36 Generally, contempt is divided into two categories: direct and
constructive, or indirect.37 The underlying principles behind direct con-
tempt, theoretically, are that a judge has before her all the facts necessary
to impose a sanction—indeed, she has personal knowledge of all the
facts—so the full panoply of rights otherwise required prior to imposing a
jail sanction are not necessary and a defendant can be convicted without
traditional trial-like protections.38 Direct contempts, in their purest form,
are limited to punishing actions that occur in the courtroom itself, such as
a frustrated defendant’s unruly outburst or an overzealous attorney’s con-
tinued flouting of a judicial ruling. The courts and the legislatures have
given the judiciary the tool of contempt as a means of maintaining order
and decorum in the courtroom.39
At a direct contempt hearing, there is no formal opportunity for
presenting facts or calling witnesses.40 By contrast, constructive contempts
are reserved for activities about which the court lacks all the necessary facts
and therefore must rely on the testimony of witnesses.41 Examples include
prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence, violation of protective orders,
and improper juror contact.42 Before a defendant can be sentenced to con-
34. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948) (“Except for a narrowly limited category of
contempts, due process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires that one charged with
contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a
chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation.”).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Onu, 730 F.2d 253, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Allis, 531
F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir. 1976); Jessup v. Clark, 490 F.2d 1068, 1072 (3d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Delahanty, 488 F.2d 396, 397 (6th Cir. 1973); In re Lamson, 468 F.2d 551, 552 (1st Cir.
1972) (per curiam); United States v. Willett, 432 F.2d 202, 205 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). But
see In re Gates, 478 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); In re Niblack, 476 F.2d 930,
933 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
36. See infra note 48.
37. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 157 (2015).
38. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275 (“The narrow exception to these due process requirements
includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs
the court’s business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of
the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to
prevent ‘demoralization of the court’s authority’ before the public.”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Constructive Contempt, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
42. See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Lodgenet Entm’t Corp., 976 F. Supp. 917
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding company in contempt for violation for protective order); Alan v. State,
39 So. 3d 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (contempt for improper juror contact); In re Burns, 800
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structive contempt, the court must give the defendant notice of the
charges against him and a hearing date.43 At the hearing, the defendant is
entitled to counsel, to call witnesses, and to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.44
In some states, including Louisiana, the courts have explicitly held
that missing court constitutes direct contempt, which, as discussed above
can be punished summarily without a chance to speak in mitigation.45
Indeed, in Louisiana contumacious failure to appear in court when sub-
poenaed is specifically enumerated as a direct contempt in the direct con-
tempt statute.46
Rendering an absence from a court punishable by direct contempt is
inherently illogical, not to mention “contumacious” absence. How can a
judge have the information necessary to adjudge a person guilty of inten-
tional failure to appear? The majority of federal courts have recognized this
logical fallacy, and they have held that failure to appear cannot be punished
with summary contempt proceedings.47  Nonetheless, state courts have re-
peatedly overlooked, ignored, or rejected the mens rea requirement of di-
rect contempt when it comes to allegations of absconding from court.48
So. 2d 833, 841 (La. 2001) (regarding prosecutor planting evidence); State v. Wisniewski, 708
P.2d 1031, 1036 (N.M. 1985) (upholding the sanctioning of a violation of the prosecution’s duty
to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence with indirect contempt).
43. See, e.g., Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275 (“Except for a narrowly limited category of con-
tempts, due process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires that one charged with con-
tempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a
chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation.”).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Lyons v. Superior Court, 278 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1955); State v. Owen (In re
Hale), 893 P.2d 818 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93 (Ind. 1994); State v.
Clark, 275 P.3d 931 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (unpublished); State v. Williams, 637 So. 2d 1230 (La.
App. 1994).
46. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21 (1966) (“Contumacious failure to comply with
a subpoena or summons to appear in court, proof of service of which appears of record.”).
47. See supra note 35.
48. See, e.g., In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93, 95 (Ind. 1994) (“Courts are sharply divided,
however, as to whether such an attorney may be summarily punished for the absence or whether
some ‘due process’ is required. In most jurisdictions, the debate centers on whether the con-
tempt was direct or indirect.”). Compare Pennsylvania v. Marcone, 410 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1980)
(direct contempt) with In re Williams, 817 P.2d 139, 144 (Idaho 1991) (“The court is aware that
the attorney’s presence is required, that the attorney was aware that his presence was necessary
and that the attorney is absent. Once the attorney has been given the opportunity to explain the
absence to the court, all elements of direct contempt are present. Therefore, the attor-
ney’s absence is a direct contempt.”), People v. Mann, 460 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(indirect contempt), State v. Williams, 637 So. 2d 1230, 1236 (La. App. 1994) (“Thus, the
defendant’s contention that such failure to appear resulted only in a constructive contempt has
no merit.”), In re Hampton, 919 So. 2d 949, 960 (Miss. 2006), and In re Yengo, 417 A.2d 533,
541 (N.J. 1980) (“We conclude that the mere unexplained absence of an attorney is a hybrid.”).
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The distinction between direct contempt and constructive contempt
is critical for an additional reason: courts have concluded that the right to
counsel attaches at a constructive contempt proceeding but not at a direct
contempt proceeding.49  This means that a person who fails to appear to
pay his fine after pleading guilty at arraignment can then be sentenced to
jail time for direct contempt without having the opportunity to confer
with counsel, let alone to call witnesses to explain his absence.50
The promise of Shelton has been broken because the original un-
counseled plea leads to jail time when the judge issues a direct contempt
sentence based on failure to appear in the original case. The defendant
pled guilty without speaking to a lawyer and was later held in contempt
without a lawyer. And because these are “non-complex” cases, when the
defendant first appeared in court he was only entitled to the most summary
of warnings about the implications of waiving his right to counsel, no one
is ever required to explain that the sentence imposed could set off a chain
of unfortunate events that could end with jail time.51
On the other hand, a wealthy defendant would not face the same
predicament. She could afford an attorney and in many cases would seek
counsel. She could pay the imposed fine, so she would not fear going to
court empty-handed. By contrast, in the case of the indigent defendant
above, although no point on his path to jail violated Bearden, he was, for all
intents and purposes, jailed for being poor.
III. RENEWING BEARDEN’S PROMISE
The injustices pervading our country’s courtrooms should not drive
us into despair. Policymakers are increasingly aware of the social and eco-
nomic harm our over-incarceration addiction continues to cause.52 Now is
49. See, e.g., Davis v. Harmony House Nursing Home, 800 So. 2d 92, 95 (La. App. 2001)
(“The procedural safeguards, including the right to a hearing and the right to counsel, do not
attach to direct contempt, because all of the facts constituting a direct contempt are within the
knowledge of the court.”); State v. Newson, 753 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“Since we
find Defendant was summarily punished for direct contempt, the right to counsel also did not
attach.”); State v. Pearson (Pearson & Pearson), 900 P.2d 533, 536 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (“By
express statutory terms, there is no right to counsel in a summary contempt proceeding.”); Ex
parte Flournoy, 312 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Tex. 1958) (“Litigants and others appearing in court are
certainly not entitled to counsel and a hearing before they may be committed for every type of
direct contempt.”).
50. See supra note 45.
51. See supra note 49.
52. See, e.g., Leigh Ann Caldwell, Koch Brothers, White House Seize Momentum on Criminal
Justice Reform, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:29 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/bar
ack-obama/kochs-white-house-seize-momentum-criminal-justice-reform-n480561.
SPRING 2016] Bearden-Based Debtors’ Prison Litigation 373
the time to leverage that public sentiment into judicial and legislative
action.53
I have repeatedly argued that the practices described in this Essay are,
for the most part, legal. I should clarify at this juncture that each action,
taken by itself, is facially legal. The collective result, however, is not.54
How to effectively attack the collective result is the challenge facing mod-
ern litigators. In Bearden, the Court declined to determine whether equal
protection or due process was the proper framework for analyzing the
question of whether a court could legally imprison a defendant for failing
to pay assessed court fees.55 The Court intimated in a footnote that sub-
stantive due process was likely the better course,56 but it has since empha-
sized the equal protection aspects of the holding.57 Ultimately though,
Bearden presented a straightforward question to the Court, which it could
resolve on direct appeal rather than through complicated impact
litigation.58
The more subtle but equally unjust practices described in this Essay
are harder to litigate because each individual case may not run afoul of the
law, but as demonstrated through the examples above, the collective, re-
peated practices undoubtedly have a disparate impact on the poor. Show-
ing the frequency of the practices at issue can demonstrate the improper
motives of the judges who use them. Proving the pernicious intent and the
pretextual nature of these judges’ actions is no small task. The first step,
53. See, e.g., Alex Altman, Koch Brother Teams Up with Liberals on Criminal Justice Reform,
TIME (Jan. 29, 2015), http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice/; Michael
Schmidt, U.S. to Release 6,000 Inmates from Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2015, at A1.
54. The disparate impact of the various courts’ actions could conceivably be challenged as
part of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action or, in some circumstances, on direct appeal. The specifics of
how such a suit would look are outside the scope of this Essay.
55. 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983).
56. Id. at n.8 (“A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly con-
fronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant’s financial background can play in
determining an appropriate sentence. When the court is initially considering what sentence to
impose, a defendant’s level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classifica-
tion. Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting ‘the
problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally
accomplished,’ North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate
question is whether consideration of a defendant’s financial background in setting or resetting a
sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process.”).
57. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 105 (1996) (“Also rejected is respondents’ sugges-
tion that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, effectively overruled the Griffin line of cases in
1976 by rejecting the notion that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it
may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. That this Court has not so conceived
the meaning and effect of Washington v. Davis is demonstrated by Bearden, 461 U.S., at 664-665,
in which the Court adhered in 1983 to Griffin’s principle of ‘equal justice.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
58. 461 U.S. at 662.
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though, is apparent. Practitioners must document these practices and col-
lect data when they occur. Since data collection is onerous, especially for
practitioners in high volume courts, they should create a centralized
method for data collection and make effective use of volunteers and court
observers to help them document concerns.
Data is necessary because these practices are unlikely to be scruti-
nized carefully unless policymakers and appellate judges can see the fre-
quency with which they occur and the damage being inflicted on our
communities as a result. Advocates and litigators should use the data they
collect to leverage legislatures to change these unjust practices or courts to
mandate that such practices can no longer be used.
CONCLUSION
Bearden’s importance to the quest for justice cannot be overstated.
However, much like the modern civil rights battles that combat subtler but
equally pernicious racism, the next wave of debtors’ prison litigation must
recognize the loopholes and shortcomings of existing precedent and seek
to push courts and policymakers to acknowledge and address the myriad
ways the poor continue to be ushered to jailhouses by our criminal injus-
tice system.
